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About the MIT Japan Program
and its Working Paper Series
The MIT Japan Program was founded in 1981 to create a new generation
of technologically sophisticated "Japan-aware" scientists, engineers, and
managers in the United States. The Program's corporate sponsors, as well
as support from the government and from private foundations, have made
it the largest, most comprehensive, and most widely emulated center of
applied Japanese studies in the world.
The intellectual focus of the Program is to integrate the research
methodologies of the social sciences, the humanities, and technology to
approach issues confronting the United States and Japan in their relations
involving science and technology. The Program is uniquely positioned to
make use of MIT's extensive network of Japan-related resources, which
include faculty, researchers, and library collections, as well as a Tokyo-
based office. Through its three core activities, namely, education,
research, and public awareness, the Program disseminates both to its
sponsors and to the interested public its expertise on Japanese science
and technology and on how that science and technology is managed.
The MIT Japan Program Working Paper Series provides an important
means to achieving these ends.
Introduction
We know from the many thorough studies of the domestic Japanese firm
that Japanese corporate "know-how" is more than technological innovation riding
on financial clout.' Japanese corporations's organizational forms and managerial
practices have been shown to be particular, powerful, and profitable. Expansion
offshore, however, has naturally required substantial organizational and
managerial modifications at Japanese firms as they move beyond their familiar --
and apparently extremely consequential -- domestic economic, political, and social
environment. Host countries have gained important economic stimulus as a result
of Japanese investment, but questions have arisen concerning the
accomplishments of Japanese multinational corporations (MNCs) in implanting
their powerful management technologies abroad. This issue may be especially
relevant in Asia where, compared with Europe and North America, the impact of
Japanese foreign direct investment (FDI) on both national economies and the
structure of industrialization has been far more pronounced.
Among Japanese MNCs the urgency to change and adapt has been most
acute at large, world class manufacturing firms. Structural adjustments of the
Japanese economy and intense competition between manufacturers have led to a
l The classic literature on the organization and management of large scale
private enterprises in modern Japan is: Robert E. Cole, Japanese Blue Collar
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1971); Ronald Dore,
British Factory, Jaanese Factoy (Los Angeles: University of California Press,
1973); Thomas P. Rohlen, For Harmony and Strength: Japanese White-Collar
Organization in Anthropoloaical Perspective (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1974); Rodney Clark, The Japanese Company (New Haven and London:
Yale University Press, 1979); and Jame§ C. Abegglen and George Stalk, Jr.,
Kaisha: The Japanese Corporation (Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle, 1985).
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rapid increase in the proportion and geographic diversity of their offshore
production, especially since the revaluation of the yen in 1985. Thus the
combination of domestic economic pressures to move production offshore and
generic characteristics of manufacturing, such as high density and breadth of
interactions with the local environment, make Japanese manufacturers abroad
ideal subjects for the study of managerial adaptations. In addition, the proliferation
of manufacturing by both Japanese and Western MNCs in Asia provides us with
an extremely rich data set for comparing patterns of adaptation of firms with
different home countries. 2
Where one stands on the question, "Does the ownership of MNCs matter?",
may depend on where one collects information. Data in this paper is grounded,
first, on an examination of the broad set of linkages between Japanese
headquarters and Thai subsidiaries -- from the home office perspective -- based
on data collection and interviews with managers in Japan who oversee operations
in Thailand and, second, on the overseas subsidiary perspective based on an
extensive period of anthropology-style participant-observation inside subsidiaries of
MNCs in Thailand. This paper thus analyses adaptations at the firm level to the
pressures of operating in foreign environments, and specifically treats the means
taken by Japanese manufacturers to move their local Thai staff toward
standardized production. The paper will also contrast managerial style at
2 In this paper I am defining multinationals based in North America and
Europe as "Western MNCs." For the purposes of this paper, with its explicit focus
on Japanese MNCs, it would be a distraction to overly qualify the alternative
management model I will propose for Western MNCs. I do however recognize
that there are important variations between "Western MNCs," though those
variations are less pronounced in management than in other areas.
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subsidiaries of Japanese and Western MNCs in Thailand. How might we proceed
in understanding how MNCs manage know-how in foreign environments, why they
do it differently, and the implications of those differences?
Multinational corporations attempt to fulfill their goal of profit seeking based
on similar sets of external constraints and opportunities in each particular foreign
environment. At a high level in the corporation strategic decisions on foreign
direct investment are taken which may allow MNCs to, for example, benefit from
lower labor costs, avoid restrictions on foreign trade, capture local expertise and
information, gain tax relief through transfer pricing, sell their locally-produced
goods in local or regional markets, reverse import products to their home markets,
etc. And once foreign investments are made all MNCs manufacturing abroad are
faced with a generic problem: how to overlay the varied environments in which
they manufacture with a grid of training and tools that develops and maintains
local skills so that goods are produced at "standards" acceptable to their sales
market. Thus, for example, Japanese and Western chip manufacturers face
similar local constraints at an industrial park in Malaysia where they compete to
produce micro-chips with similar specifications for personal computer
manufacturers. Or, from a different perspective but demonstrating the same
underlying principle, at Japanese-owned color picture tube subsidiaries in Mexico
and Thailand, assuming machinery is similar, the same basic skills must be
developed so that standardized product can be assembled and sold in the United
States. The core problem in manufacturing abroad, then, is how to produce
standardized output in unfamiliar local environments. Engineers may switch or
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alter machines to more easily cope with local worker capabilities, but over the long
run this provides relatively marginal flexibility. MNCs must successfully make
"managerial technology transfers" so that machines are used efficiently.
While the terminology suggests mechanical precision, managerial
technology transfer concerns the processes of learning about the interplay of
technical information and the social arrangements surrounding industrial
production. Whether planned or not, managerial technology transfer will in
practice reflect the local environment, such as the skills background of local staff,
local organizational culture, locally available hardware, etc., as local conditions
interact with know-how carried to the overseas subsidiary. All MNCs operating in
the same foreign environment face broadly similar constraints then. However, at
the point where managerial technology transfer enters in there appears to be
considerable divergence in their practices. And these divergences tend to divide
according to home country origin of the multinational. This paper thus supports
the view that ownership matters to managerial technology transfer.
The paper is organized as follows: I begin by explaining why I chose to
conduct fieldwork in Thailand (including the relevance of the Thai case to analysis
of FDI throughout Asia), and briefly describe my study sites and the methodology
employed for field research. I will then present a brief model of "Japanese
manufacturing" as I believe it is understood by Japanese managers who are sent
out to Japanese subsidiaries abroad. In order to provide one kind of gauge on
the success of managerial technology transfers, I report on the placement of well-
known Japanese shopfloor techniques in Thai subsidiaries. A measure of
5
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transfers at a particular factory at a particular moment in time, however, tells us
little about the processes through which these transfers occur. The paper
therefore shifts emphasis from activity on the shopfloor to an examination of
managerial aspects of the technology transfer process. Here I underscore the
interactions between expatriate and Thai engineers, which I argue is the most
critical point in the technology transfer process in its overseas setting, and I will
contrast these interactions at Japanese and Western MNCs operating in Thailand.
I will argue that distinctive practices of managerial technology transfer at MNCs
are specific to the home country of the MNC, and that these practices are based
on the internal dynamics, or the organizational cultures, of the firms themselves in
their home country setting. In order to yield insight into how Japanese managers
think and act on the problems of production abroad, I propose some brief
explanations of Japanese MNC behavior in Thailand within the conceptual logic of
Japanese managers. I close with suggestions regarding the implications of
variations in managerial technology transfer to both the development of MNCs and
to patterns of industrialization among host countries in Asia.
Thai Study Sites and Methodology
I focussed my study on subsidiaries of multinational corporations in
Thailand for five reasons:
1) Compared with some of its South East Asian neighbors the Thai
government has prepared the ground for substantial FDI through a relative
preponderance of incentives and lack of formal restrictions. The combination of
6
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liberal economic policy and general flexibility in technocratic intervention on the
ground makes the investment and operational environment comparatively laissez-
faire. In terms of the research this investment climate suggests that firm level
motivations, rather than responses to host government pressures, tend to guide
changes in management practice of MNC subsidiaries in Thailand. Since I am
essentially interested in generating conclusions about the behavior of
multinationals abroad, Thailand is ideally positioned for the study.
2) Subsidiaries of MNCs in Thailand vary considerably as to product, size,
and length of presence in the country. The research design captured many of
these variations, and thus analysis addresses the relevance of these factors. In
addition I have a longitudinal data set on the firms I studied in detail.
3) The scale and impact of FDI on the Thai economy and society is
extreme; so analyzing the Thai case is important in its own right.
4) Industrialization in Thailand speaks to several important issues in the
general analysis of regional development in Asia. The Thai case has already
been treated as a challenge to the "Asian developmental state" and "flying geese"
explanations, by political scientists and economists respectively, of economic
success in the Asian newly industrialized economies (NIEs).3 The former model
3 The "Asian developmental state" model was first articulated in Chalmers
Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-
1975 (Stanford:Stanford University Press, 1982). Bernard and Ravenhill cite the
original notion of "flying geese" from Akamatsu Kaname, "Shinkoku Kogyokoku no
Sangyo Hatten" [Report on Industrial Development in Industrialized Countries],
Ueda Tejiro Hakushi Kinen Nonbunsho [sic] 4 (July 1937). They also trace very
clearly the intellectual history of the concept and its latter day interchangeability
with the "product cycle theory." See pp. 172-179 in Mitchell Bernard and John
Ravenhill, "Beyond Product Cycles and Flying Geese: Regionalization, Hierarchy,
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proposes a pan-Asian pattern of industrialization modelled on the Japanese
government's strong interventions in domestic economic affairs; the latter the
development of an Asian "product cycle" in which waves of industrial technologies
developed and exploited by Japanese industry are later captured by the NIEs, and
in turn captured by the next set of industrializing countries in Southeast Asia.
Although refined by the addition of the notion of "Asian industrial networks," 4 the
product cycle theory largely fits the Thai case. I agree, however, with critics of the
Asian developmental state model that Thailand's dramatic economic growth in the
1980s evolved without, or in spite of, government intervention.5 This discussion
must, in any case, be considered on-going as Thailand, undermined by close
neighbors with much lower labor costs, attempts to make its way up the
technology ladder: Unlike its NIE predecessors, Thailand has a weak educational
base and a tendency for the state to avoid serious intervention in economic affairs.
At present its moves toward higher technology manufacturing is strongly assisted,
if not driven, by foreign direct investment. Some questions of relevance are, then:
Will the potency of FDI continue to be sufficient in terms of capital and, critically,
skills development to sustain Thai industrial growth? If sufficient capital were
available does Thailand have the know-how to own and manage firms, such as
and the Industrialization of Asia," World Politics (Vol. 47, January 1995). For an
early application and response to these theories in the context of Thailand see
Daniel H. Unger, "Japan, the Overseas Chinese, and Industrialization in Thailand,"
Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Political Science, University of California,
Berkeley, 1989.
4 This is the thrust of Bernard and Ravenhill's article, ibid.
5 See, for example, Unger, op. cit.
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those found in the Asian NIEs which dynamically participate in world markets?6
What lessons does Thailand provide in the strong state-weak state debate
concerning economic growth?
5) And what are the implications of the Thai experience for other parts of
Asia that are now turning to industrialization? The evolution of investment in
Thailand may represent a pattern we can anticipate of new investment in other
countries in Asia, especially those characterized by lower cost/lower skilled labor
and rapidly expanding local markets. Here I am thinking of the "next wave" of
Japanese investment in China, Indochina (especially Vietnam), and South Asia, all
of which are recent recipients of, or are targeted by, multinational investors,
especially the Japanese. -- Only a few of these issues will be covered in this
paper. Nonetheless, they point to the relevance of the Thai case for generating
analyses of the impact of multinational investment.
After fieldwork at the headquarters of several multinationals in Japan, I
gathered data on the management of 15 wholly-owned MNC subsidiary
manufacturers, predominately Japanese companies, in Thailand. I conducted
detailed fieldwork at a consumer electronics plant, which assembled audio and
video cassettes, and an automobile manufacturer, for 10 and 7 months
respectively. (Thai staff outnumbered Japanese managers 400:7 and 600:12 in
6 A sense of this dynamism among the NIEs, especially as it concerns
"Chinese" firms, can be found in a draft paper by Michael Borrus, "Left for Dead:
Asian Production Networks and the Revival of U.S. Electronics" in Barry Naughton,
ed., The China Circle: Economics and Electronics in the PRC. Taiwan and Honq
Konq (working title, forthcoming 1996).
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these factories, though temporary Japanese "advisors" were also often present.
Both plants had been manufacturing in Thailand for around five years at the time
of the study.) Data was gathered at 13 other plants, for periods ranging from
several days to six weeks, which had different dominant features (same product
but earlier establishment in Thailand, manufacture of a different product by same
parent multinational, same product but Western parent, etc.).7
7 Viewed from the perspectives of other disciplines, it may seem an
anachronism of anthropology that field sites, in this case the names of the
companies and their subsidiaries, are disguised. The downside is that there is
already a literature which I cannot cite on many of these companies, all of which
are first tier manufacturers and conglomerates; indeed "household names."
Overall, however, the advantages far outweighed this disadvantage. I could not
have enjoyed the degree of access required for the detailed study I made at the
two multinationals that were the focus of in-depth work without this foundation of
anonymity. Negotiating access to these companies was a difficult process and
their final acceptance of my day-to-day participant-observation came to be based
on their belief that I could be trusted in this matter. Once this occurred I was no
longer "handled." Indeed, I was often surprised that no effort was made to shield
sensitive matters from me. To date, critics of this anonymity have been
academics, while businessmen, familiar with logic of screening information, have
appreciated the value and intent of this aspect of my methodology. The ethics of
the matter, of course, stand for the study of modern enterprises as they do for
more mainstream subjects of anthropological inquiry: At the level of intimacy
required for sound ethnographic work, it would simply present too great a risk to
individuals within companies if even the company were named, to say nothing of
the potential damage to the firms vis-a-vis their competitors. This is not a study of
the past, but of firms and careers in progress.
Having approached the field with these considerations in mind, I was
required to see it through at the 13 other firms where I collected data for shorter
periods of time, even though the work was much less revealing and these
companies would probably have allowed me to take their names public.
Apart from matters of ethics and methodological taste, there are other
advantages in disguising the names of the companies: These companies are so
well known that mentioning them inevitably pushes forward images of products
and, among specialists, notions as to specific corporate styles. These
conventional wisdoms are extremely difficult to dislodge, in spite of claims that we
are willing to start fresh with new data. While I am at times sorely tempted to
debunk notions of how particular corporations are run, this is not the goal of this
research project. I will continue to simply tip my hat at the successes of these
10
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The research was, thus, designed to produce the generalizable findings
expected of standard social science practice while in-depth, case specific
anthropological methods characterized day-to-day fieldwork. In order to generate
a background for the study, I collected data and conducted structured and open
interviews with academics, government officials, and other specialists. At the
companies themselves, in addition to interviewing, surveying, and collecting an
array of primary documents, I was intensively involved in participant-observation of
activities in and outside the workplace, collected case studies in real time,
conducted content and other analyses of meetings, training sessions, and
shopfloor activities, etc.
The "Japanese" Model
In brief, the strength of Japanese manufacturing in the postwar period has
been characterized by its avoidance of "Fordism" -- the model associated with
industrial production in the West -- or the "atomization" of the work force. In its
most exaggerated form the Fordism image is of a worker defined as a commodity
(like a machine or a raw material) in the mass production equation repetitively
performing a simple and specified task with no knowledge either of the relationship
of his work to the product produced nor, perhaps, the overall organization itself. In
contrast, organizational style in "Japanese manufacturing" stresses task flexibility
and dependency between organizational components of the manufacturing
firms' public relations departments.
11
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process. The system is based on strong information flows throughout the
organizational hierarchy generated by a work force capable of communicating
efficiently and accurately. Ideally the system devolves authority -- over a limited
sphere of activities -- down to lower levels than would be the case in a traditional
Western manufacturing model. Thus, workers, who are generally highly trained,
appear to have a high degree of autonomy over their specific tasks while at the
same time pushing a great deal of information about those tasks into the system.
The Japanese model is relevant to this study because it fairly accurately
represents the experience of Japanese managers when they are transferred to
overseas operations. The model is, of course, most powerfully articulated within
the general systems and history of the firms to which each manager is attached.
However, many of the so-called "Japanese" management techniques - often
renamed in non-Japanese contexts - have now become normative among
manufacturers worldwide.8 This broad acknowledgement of the strengths of
Japanese management has reinforced the confidence of Japanese managers in
their models, especially at firms with strong manufacturing traditions such as the
ones I studied. This process has, in turn, been encouraged by the Japanese
media, where a vast array of publications target an avid audience of business
managers and engineers. Japanese managers, then, carry to their overseas
assignments a model of management that sits in a strong position within the public
a In U.S. manufacturing we should note, for example, that while in the
1970s and early 1980s the recalcitrance of the U.S. automotive industry to new
techniques was well-publicized, the computer industry has never lagged in taking
on board, or re-inventing, techniques that might improve productivity. Many of
these closely correspond with "Japanese" models.
12
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culture of Japan and the private cultures of their firms. This has generated a
rather understandable expectation that the management of company subsidiaries
abroad should remain consistent with it. So, how successful is Japanese
management on the ground at Japanese subsidiaries in Thailand?
The Shopfloor
One way of gauging success may be to look at Japanese shopfloor
activities. Often cited by industrial specialists and academics as "representative"
activities, they are a shorthand to measure the progress of a factory toward an
ideal state of "Japanese manufacturing."9 Starting with such "findings" as the use
of similar uniforms implying that firm members are unaware of hierarchical
divisions, I would be the first to suggest that the categories "Japanese
manufacturing" and "Japanese shopfloor techniques" have yet to be appropriately
problematized. (This is, indeed, one of the goals of a larger work also using the
field data from which this paper is drawn.) Nonetheless, for the purposes of this
paper, they are convenient markers to ground our discussion.' ° Here I will briefly
give an explanation of some common shopfloor techniques in Japan and contrast
9 This literature is long in the public domain and longer in management
consultant reports. The spate of interest in Japanese techniques in U.K.
manufacturing from the 1980s onward is representative. A relatively sophisticated
example along this line is Nicholas Oliver and Barry Wilkinson, The Japanization
of British Industry (Oxford:Blackwell, 1992).
iO We should recognize that in Japan the use of these techniques varies
considerably. In the firms I studied they see heavy use on the shopfloor in Japan
and are taken very seriously in the lore of their corporate cultures.
13
them with conditions observed in Thailand:
Quality control circles (QCC) are small group activities in which, typically,
assembly line workers share ideas about how to solve minor problems on their
lines. Ideas are tested by gathering data from the line that can be analyzed using
simple statistical techniques. "Circles" are based on the intuitive logic that a
worker who is thinking could probably make valuable suggestions regarding how
to work more productively. In the process of participating in "circles" workers are
meant to become more interested in their jobs and more committed to their
colleagues and the company." While there are, of course, variations in Japan,
QC circles meet once or twice a week near the shop floor, after work, for 30-40
minutes. Workers are not paid for their participation. - In Thai plants, QC circles
were conducted under overtime pay conditions. In many plants they were dropped
altogether because of heavy production deadlines. In all plants rudimentary
analytical tools were utilized to identify the sources of production difficulties.
Muda-dori (time and resource management) is highly valued among
Japanese manufacturers as a general paradigm under which waste, defined both
in physical terms and in terms of time, is cut out of the production process. It
includes just-in-time (JIT) delivery of parts by both external and "internal"
suppliers. - In Thailand, plant lay-out reflected the scheme, eg. every tool,
machine, and supply bin was in its designated place. However more complex
measures were avoided. For example, the application of calculations to straight
11 "Circle" imagery has an explicitly industrial connotation and has
perhaps replaced sports analogies, such as "teamwork," prevalent in the
organizational images of manufacturing in earlier eras.
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measurements in order to identify waste or "noise" on productions lines -- a
common Muda-dori activity within quality control circles in Japan -- was avoided.
(Waste reduction on the lines in Thailand was the responsibility of production
engineers; as is associated with traditional Western systems.) The notion of
different segments of the production process as "customers" was poorly
developed. Just-in-time delivery by outside suppliers, even Japanese owned
suppliers, was not attempted. Indeed, the Japanese joked among themselves that
one Japanese automobile assembler had a year's worth of supplies stockpiled on
its huge lot.
Through job rotation a typical worker at a large firm, who is likely to spend
his entire working career in that firm, will change tasks and learn new skills such
that he will eventually have worked or managed the work of a number of lines or
task areas. Over the course of his career his broad, hands-on knowledge of the
factory will make him a more competent manager. -- I observed almost no cases
of job rotation among workers in the factories I studied. Thai workers were
extremely reticent to change tasks, because they interpreted it as an indication
that they were judged incompetent in their current jobs, and they did not want to
separate themselves from the social relationships they had established with their
co-workers. Japanese managers were satisfied with the arrangement as it
generated stability on the production line and did not require that they design
training for new tasks. The calculation by Japanese managers on how intensively
to rotate Thai engineers was based essentially on discussion concerning whether
it was best to spread out limited engineering resources by frequent rotation or
15
keep good engineers focussed on tasks they could manage consistently. The
latter formula overwhelmingly prevailed.
On the job training (OJT) may be considered characteristic of Japanese
manufacturing as part of a system in which workers in Japan are given the
responsibility for quickly learning new tasks on a functioning line -- where mistakes
immediately affect output - under the tutelage of an experienced co-worker. A
new line member is motivated, by design, by awareness of the effect on all the
line members of his or her failure to quickly learn new tasks. It should be
recognized that in Japan the basic skills that even new recruits bring to the factory
generally surpasses other industrialized countries. - On the job training
overwhelmingly predominated in Thai factories. However, this was explained in
interviews as a response to high demand for output. Japanese managers felt that
Thai workers had plenty of generic potential but were inexperienced and poorly
trained. As a result, in addition to OJT, limited classroom work on assembly in the
automobile plant was conducted by Japanese foremen flown in from Japan with a
Thai manager translating. With materials in Japanese or English, the experience
was frustrating for all involved. In the consumer electronics plant, manuals had
been translated into Thai and Thai mid-level managers conducted some training.
However, they were insecure in their knowledge of Japanese systems, a topic I
will explore below.
Japanese managers in Thailand were forced, or chose, to limit the use of
Japanese shopfloor methods in practice. Perhaps this is normal and explainable
16
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by the fact that the plants I studied in-depth were start-ups, in operation for around
five years, with a largely inexperienced labor force. In these plants many
Japanese managers told me that they fully expected that within 10-15 years
shopfloor and production systems in their Thai factories would match those in
place at "sister plants" in Japan. Naturally, therefore, the inclusion of a Japanese
subsidiary that had been manufacturing locally for over 30 years was significant
among my case studies. Whereas the average age of workers in the start-ups
was 24 years, in the older plant the majority of workers "grew up with the
company;" they had joined young and stayed, averaging 37 years of age. The
observation of serious limits on the extensiveness of "Japanese management
techniques" was consistent in this older plant (and others) with an experienced
labor force. The President of this company told me that try as he had, he simply
could not get these systems in place in Thailand to any degree that approached
their use in Japan.
Since no product may be released from the factory below standard, intense
output pressures and the human and physical resources on the ground have
combined in Thai subsidiaries to produce a set of manufacturing methods very
much at odds with the Japanese ideal. The production system in Thailand reflects
a top-down flow of information, with decisions controlled tightly by a centralized
cadre of managers and engineers. It appears that Japanese multinationals in
Thailand have reproduced the atomization of labor and strong centralization of
decision-making authority -- the "Fordism" -- that they managed to avoid in
postwar Japan.
17
What Is Happening, or What Is Not Happening,
at Japanese Subsidiaries in Thailand?
While there is a literature, largely focussed on North American and
European cases, addressing shopfloor activities in Japanese multinationals
abroad, very little is written on local management and their interactions with
Japanese supervisors. 2 The more I studied it the more confident I became that
exploring local management and their interactions with Japanese supervisors
would ultimately yield the most accurate explanations of my specific observations
concerning the shopfloor and my general analysis of how Japanese organizations
go through the process of adjusting to cross-cultural conditions.
Expatriates in manufacturing MNCs abroad are proportionately few in
number and may occupy "advisor" positions on the edges of factory organizational
charts, but they are in the highest positions of authority in these firms. They
ordinarily spend little time on the shop floor itself, relying on their high ranking
local colleagues to carry managerial decisions forward and keep them consistent
down through the organizational structure. Information about what is to be
transferred down the hierarchy is, thus, making its most critical cross-cultural leap
in the decision-making and communication patterns between expatriate and top
local managers. The capacity of local and expatriate personnel, typically at an
upper level, to share information strongly affects the development of capabilities
12 On the U.K. see Oliver and Wilkinson, op. cit, as well as
P. Garrahan and P. Stewart, The Nissan Eniama: Flexibilitv at Work in a Local
Economy, (Mansell, 1992); and Williams, et al. Cars: Analysis., History, Cases,
(Berghan Books, 1994). Work on the U.S. has been less consistent and driven far
more by negative opinion than by analysis within factories.
18
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among lower level, local staff to successfully handle technology closer to the
production line.
Thus, I judged what I would call "insecurity" or "under-confidence" over
technical matters among Thai managers and engineers in Japanese firms as
extremely significant. It contrasted with the situation in Japan and my
understanding, based on interviews with Thai managers and the statements of
Japanese managers, that Thai engineers in the plants I studied were generally
competent.
How would these "insecurities" be explained? My findings suggest that
Japanese engineers controlled decisions that their Thai colleagues were --
technically speaking -- capable of making, thus preventing them from gaining
experience and confidence in specific tasks. Supporting evidence comes in the
form of a simple arithmetic of ex-patriot personnel, in this case from chip
manufacturers: Japanese manufacturers in Thailand typically have three to four
times the number of ex-patriot engineers as their Western counterparts using
similar technologies in similar scale plants. Japanese engineers are deeply
involved in controlling engineering tasks in Thailand.
And How Does It Compare?
Western firms face the same conditions generic to manufacturing in
Thailand as their Japanese counterparts. They are, for example, also operating in
an investment regime that is relatively laissez-faire, using a labor force with a
19
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rudimentary education, hiring "overpaid" engineers, and conducting business with
high production output pressures for a rapidly expanding local and/or regional
economy, or, although comparatively rarely, for re-export to their home country.
What is interesting, of course, is how firms cope differently with these conditions.
Similar to Japanese firms, expatriate managers in Western firms control
finance and investment, and determine output and product design at their plants in
Thailand. These tasks are managed, however, with far fewer expatriates than is
the case at Japanese plants. Typically, at a Western plant that is running
normally, two or three expatriates will cover the tasks of president/chief financial
officer and chief engineer/conduit for product design from headquarters. (If there
is a third expatriate, he tends to be an engineer.) The generic expatriate
structure of a Japanese plant would have a president, a financial controller, parts
and procurement officer, (possibly a planning officer) and, on the production side,
a highly experienced plant manager, and engineers as production control manager
and quality control manager. Two or three additional Japanese engineers are
likely to operate under these production side managers. And there tends to be a
steady stream of advisors, also predominately engineers, on temporary visits from
Japan.
In this paper I have chosen to stress the organizational and social control of
the production engineering because, 1) this is the area where the most important
distinctions appear, and 2) we should consider these activities as the core activity
of manufacturing and, thus, at the center of managerial technology transfers at
MNCs. Process technologies in Japanese plants were based on information from
20
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Japanese "sister plants", often the earlier homes of equipment used in Thailand.
This is not at all surprising, though a somewhat stronger finding than at the
Western plants. Of greater interest is the observation that a key aspect of holding
back managerial technology transfers was the in-house control of decisions
concerning production tasks. This was generally conducted in impressive daily
consultations via telephone and fax between Japanese engineers at the
subsidiaries in Thailand and at "sister plants" in Japan. Thai engineers were
generally informed of the outcomes of these discussions.
The fewer number of expatriate engineers in Western firms is an indicator
of the finding that much greater responsibilities are shouldered by Thai engineers
in Western plants. My overall sense based both on observation and on the
statements of Thai and expatriate managers is that in Western firms expatriate
engineers made themselves available to assist their local (Thai) colleagues who
were in the end responsible for their production lines. Obviously conditions vary
depending on particular conditions and the skills of local engineers in particular
plants. However the management model employed by expatriate engineers -- who
were by no means always Westerners but included Singaporeans, Indians, and
Koreans - at Western firms in Thailand was quite at variance to that observed in
Japanese plants. In its idealized form the model here is of a local engineer given
production targets and told to get on with it as he sees fit. Engineers have the
opportunity to learn shopfloor techniques often much like those practiced by the
Japanese in Japan, but are made responsible for their use and, critically, their
alteration to fit local conditions on the production line. As a Thai a local engineer
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may know what best will work and what will not. Gauges on this engineer's
success and capacity are taken at close enough intervals that significant harm to
the company is largely avoided should he fail. As the president of a large,
American-owned hard drive manufacturer put it, "If after a couple of weeks
production meets or exceeds targets we simply give him another, perhaps slightly
increased, target for the next period. If he's below target, we talk. f he's below
two or three times, he's demoted or out the door."
I do not want to overstate a cowboy mentality, or rugged individualism for
managers at Western plants, nor lose sight of the variations in management styles
at Western firms in Thailand. 3 I do want to stress the distinction from Japanese
plants in the attitude concerning skills exhibited toward local managers, the
intensity of interactions between local and expatriate engineers, and the
responsibilities that local managers and engineers are expected to bear. All
manufacturing multinationals provide training, skills, and standards which they
overlay on local environments to produce goods. In comparing Western and
Japanese MNCs my data suggests that in Thailand Japanese managers are far
more aggressive in forwarding their solutions to problems at all levels of overseas
operations than are expatriate managers at Western MNCs. Thus, where
Japanese advisors will keep hold of decisions that their Thai counterparts are
capable of making, in Western firms, with their hands-off style, local engineers are
allowed to learn through the risks of failure or success. Engineers were
experiencing real on-the-job-training. Technological know-how would appear to be
13 See footnote 2 on this point.
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more successfully transferred through this latter process.
A possible test, of course, of the comparative strengths of these two styles
of managerial technology transfer might come in a study of productivity at similar
plants. Unfortunately, productivity is notoriously difficult to pin down where
machines are not identical, so I cannot provide a finding here. For plants that
have been established in the last decade my impression is that both Japanese
and Western firms are producing, and currently making profits, at about the same
rate. The more interesting problem for our purposes is why have they organized
manufacturing differently and what difference it may make over the long run?
Explaining Differences
In these concluding sections I am further from my data and closer to
conjecture and generalization. Nonetheless, I would like to briefly provide an
explanation for the findings above, and briefly comment on their effect on the
development of MNCs with different parents and the implications of Japanese
versus Western MNC investment on host countries in Asia.
I have suggested that in managerial style Western MNCs are more
successful in providing managerial technology transfers to local employees of their
operations in Asia than are Japanese MNCs. To a significant degree this is
explained by the effects of home country organizational culture demonstrated by
these firms, which overlay all other sets of decisions taken by MNCs. Home
country, or headquarters, organizational culture influences both the implicit
expectations of working practices and the policies of multinationals. At risk of
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oversimplification, in its home environment Western firms will allow managers to
take a high degree of responsibility over tasks with ex-post oversight of results.
Importantly, and not by design but rather as a residual effect of home
organizational culture, in the foreign context this hands-off style of management is
in practice less likely to conflict with local ways of organizing work. If our theory of
learning contains the notion that we build new information into the structures of
knowledge already familiar to us, arms-length management may strongly
encourage the development of local know-how as long as technical guidance is
made readily available.
By contrast, let us think about the social characteristics observed in
Japanese manufacturing at home in Japan: Important among these are long term
commitment by employees to the firm as much more than a workplace,
overlapping responsibilities, and dependence on extremely dense informational
networks which facilitate a remarkable flow of information both up and down
vertical organizational hierarchies and across horizontal organizational functions.
These characteristics have worked extremely well in domestic Japanese
manufacturing and they thereby encourage an expectation of similarly dense
information flows by Japanese managers in subsidiaries abroad. But such flows
appear to be arduous to recreate abroad because they may rely on similar
experience and assumptions about social interaction which may explain the
common observation that penetration of Japanese organizations by non-Japanese
is difficult. Inconsistencies with expectations, then, may increase the desire of
Japanese managers abroad to keep decision-making under their control and fine
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tune the work of their foreign colleagues. In practice this encourages the
presence of large numbers of Japanese engineers. 4 Because of their breadth of
marketing and production throughout the globe, we might expect Japanese
multinational manufacturers to be among the most "internationalized" of Japanese
organizations. Arguably however, as suggested above, in the cross-cultural
context flexibility problems may be exaggerated at Japanese MNC manufacturers
because of the considerable worldwide attention they have received for their
domestic production and managerial methods.
It was not part of my field research methodology to press every Japanese
manager I knew on my observations, which in any case were essentially
consolidated only after leaving the field. Nonetheless, through interviews and
participation in the successes and frustrations of months of on duty and off duty
activities, a good deal of opinion makes its way to the surface. What follows,
then, as a composite of many conversations, are five explanations for difficulties in
placing Japanese shopfloor methods in the Thai workplace. Although I add some
comment parenthetically, I am not here arguing the validity or internal consistency
of these explanations. The far more interesting point is that although these
explanations are distilled and therefore uncharacteristically pointed in tone, I think
14 In this paper I have focussed on the pull factor in explaining the
presence of large numbers of Japanese engineers in overseas subsidiaries. I
continue to consider this the key explanation. However, the phenomenon is
certainly not discouraged by an important push factor: Most large, Japanese
manufacturing MNCs are now challenged by a flattening in domestic production
while a high proportion of skilled Japanese managers and engineers, who expect
"lifetime employment," remain on their payrolls. Sending them abroad as
"advisors" helps to justify the situation, though it is enormously expensive.
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they are representative of the Japanese perspective, and they are explainable
within the framework of Japanese organizational expectations suggested in the
above paragraph. They may, therefore, begin to untangle the motivations for
actions taken at subsidiaries of Japanese MNCs in Thailand: (1) High production
pressure: Demand for goods produced in Thailand is high and requires the
expansion of production. Therefore there is little time for training or rotation.
Keeping workers on the same line assists in maintaining quality. (2) Low wages:
No motivation to put a large effort and expense into training because cost of labor
is low and will, therefore, only marginally affect productivity. Productivity will
increase in any case through the introduction of more efficient machinery. Low
wages also mean that post-production inspection is a readily available option for
quality assurance. (3) Education: Thai workers are difficult to train because they
have a much lower basic education compared with Japanese workers. Training
materials must be completely redesigned and simplified to cope with this; an
expensive and time-consuming task. Again, avoiding rotation means workers are
trained once for one job, and usually on the job itself. (4) High turnover of
personnel: Expending money on rotation and training is counter-productive
because employees leave once they have acquired valuable skills. (According to
data widely circulated among Japanese managers, turnover among workers is
fairly low, while among engineers it is high. Turnover is high among engineers not
only because they seek higher wages but because, as suggested above, many
Thai engineers feel irrelevant to Japanese decision-making about production.
(This is an obvious vicious cycle, but nonetheless difficult to correct.) With some
26
outstanding and highly paid exceptions, Thai engineers who stay at Japanese
plants tend to be relatively passive and willing to sacrifice self-expression in the
workplace for job security.) (5) No industrial tradition: Thailand is a largely
agrarian economy that has not evolved through the industrial stage of
development. Unlike conditions at subsidiaries in the US or Europe, there is no
need to work with or against industrial organizational systems already in place.
Thai organizational culture as it stands need not be scrutinized since it has not yet
been rationalized appropriately to fit modern industrial standards. Since many of
those standards are Japanese it is appropriate that much of the rationalization
process should follow a familiar Japanese path.
Among these five explanations, the fifth is the most fundamental, abstract,
and "loaded" in terms of its effect on the previous four explanations and, therefore,
its implications on managerial technology transfers at overseas subsidiaries of
Japanese manufacturers generally. It may also stimulate rich discussion, and, for
me, further research. In any case, since our project here is implicitly comparative
let us consider the matter from the Western perspective. I have characterized
Western multinationals as technically exacting, like their Japanese counterparts,
but on a managerially level cross-culturally flexible through the habits of arms-
length management. It is not that Western managers may not have opinions
about the quality of local industrial culture in the many environments in which they
manufacture, it is rather that such considerations are less relevant to operations
on the ground. This is unlike Japanese managers who are keen to forward their
own solutions to the management of production and may experience frustrations
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with the pace at which Japanese methods can be operationalized in the foreign
setting.
The Implications of Differences
There is a substantial literature on MNCs which posits their evolution along
a scale of decreasing dependence on central control and the development of a
truly international pool of managers operating in diverse environments producing a
wide variety of "products" from manufactured goods to consulting advice.
Japanese MNCs have generally been perceived at a relatively early stage along
this developmental scale. The data I have presented from Thailand leads me to
believe that the evolutionary path of the management of Japanese MNCs at both
the subsidiary level and the worldwide level is likely to be rather different from that
of Western MNCs.
First, as the start-up era of joint ownership and control of overseas
operations wanes and MNCs are increasingly moving toward explicit control, and
100% ownership where host government policies allow it, differences between the
subsidiary operations of MNCs with different parents are likely to become more
pronounced. This is especially so on the managerial level.'5 This paper has
15 Of course, the growth of majority ownership and the use of FDI to secure
access to foreign markets are widely noted examples of increasing similarities
between MNCs. It is at other levels of MNC activity that differences are
expanding. My analysis focusses on managerial dynamics. Encarnation and
Mason, for example, find differences at the level of industrial organization. For
Japanese MNCs they note the substantial growth in the scale of intra-company
trade and the development of overseas keiretsu relations mirroring those in Japan.See pp. 442-446 in D. Encarnation and M. Mason, "Does Ownership Matter?
Answers and Implications for Europe and America," in M. Mason and D.
Encarnation, Does Ownership Matter?: Jaoanese Multinationals in Europe, (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1994).
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argued strongly for the relevance of local organizational culture and knowledge to
operations within subsidiaries and, thus, to managerial technology transfers, no
matter who owns the firm. Nonetheless, this argument must be seated within the
logic of structural control of resources. Under joint ventures expatriate managers
are required at the very least to consider the reactions of local shareholders, and
in Thailand there are many cases where expatriates and Thais at the top of the
firm are deadlocked in conflicts over a range of management directions. Firms in
my study were predominately wholly-owned. Office and factory layout and formal
organizational structures more closely resembled plants in Duluth or Kawasaki
than they did Thai plants down the street. Increasingly Thai engineers and
managers at MNC subsidiaries must contend with a cross-cultural event in their
discussions with top management over how to best organize the subsidiary's
business activity. Further to this point, the experience of Thais in handling the
foreign cultures of MNCs has become part of their skill base: Thai engineers in
Japanese firms who "job hop" tend to move within a circle of Japanese firms.
Japanese managers at competing Japanese firms feel that Thais are likely to have
picked up some notion of Japanese ways even if they otherwise disapprove of job
hopping for career advancement.
Second, in this paper I have discussed in some detail the strict
centralization of decision-making authority in Japanese hands within subsidiaries.
Turning briefly beyond the plant, we should note that this centralization is also
reflected in the position of subsidiaries vis-a-vis headquarters. Subsidiaries in
Thailand are part of a tightly controlled and rigorously hierarchical organizational
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structure extending down from Japan. This lack of autonomy is suggestive:
Rather than "at an earlier stage of development compared with their Western
counterparts," in the Southeast Asian context, at least, Japanese multinationals
may be operating with an altogether different view of the value of autonomy.
Although some of the Japanese MNCs that I studied had regional Southeast Asian
headquarters "above them," these operated far more as trading clearinghouses
than they did reference points for control of subsidiaries. This inconsistency
between design and practice was a point of organizational tension within these
MNCs. Japanese managers referenced headquarters or plants in Japan for the
core of their work: technical information and individual career paths. It also
matters that the Japanese archipelago is at most only two time zones and a six
hour flight away from the vast majority of Asian subsidiaries. In Asia I expect
Japanese MNCs to remain comparatively centralized both at the subsidiary and
the international level.
Opinion varies on whether or not these differences constitute advantages or
disadvantages for MNCs. I think that continuous pressures to move production
abroad and the high cost of supplying overseas operations with expatriate
Japanese personnel will eventually disadvantage Japanese firms, other
considerations being equal. These high costs are likely to force Japanese MNCs
to expand the numerical proportions and responsibilities of local staff in spite of a
surplus of personnel in Japan and an organizational tendency to tightly control
subsidiaries. It matters that experience abroad by Japanese personnel is thin.
Although it is perfectly clear that large numbers of Japanese managers are now
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going overseas, the experience of this new cadre of international managers,
especially in managing non-Japanese, still lags well behind its counterparts at
Western firms.
Manufacturing in Asia is increasingly expensive and know-how driven. In
addition, the competition is far more complex than portrayed by the Japanese-
Western dichotomization constructed in this paper for analysis of managerial
technology transfer. A diverse set of "Chinese" firms are now major players,'6 as
are South Korean investors. In addition to capital, both technical and managerial
flexibility would appear to be key sources of strength. While Japanese companies
are feeling the effects of Japan's recession in the mid-1990s, they will remain
comparatively rich in capital for overseas investment.. The Thai data suggests,
however, that while weaving the complex fabric of managerial technology transfers
Japanese firms may experience operational difficulties.
Meanwhile, we should not lose sight of the impact on Asian host countries
of MNC operations and the implications of the Thai case to our theories of Asian
development. From the perspective of Asian host country governments, there has
been a decline in the availability of import substitution or protecting domestic
markets as a growth strategy. Industrial policies point in the relatively passive
direction of providing an attractive investment environment to harness regional
economic dynamism in Asia. In this context the heart of the matter in terms of
active host government policy may lie in the level of education and skills that local
staff can bring to industrial firms. The accomplishments of the Asian NIEs in
16 See Borrus, op. cit.
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providing a well-educated labor pool are not matched in Thailand, Indonesia, and
the Philippines. Nor are they matched in the diverse "next" Asian gaggle of flying
geese: the relatively tightly controlled economies of China, Vietnam, Burma, India
and Bangla Desh. Here industrialization is starting to play a significant role; much
of it multinational-driven, and Japanese. Realistically, if moves up the product
cycle technology ladder are to have any dynamism in these under-educationally-
endowed states, these moves will largely be the result of activity within private
corporations. In this context the notion of managerial technology transfers takes
on significance beyond the firm itself.
If my analysis is correct it would seem at present that local managers and
engineers are likely to gain more know-how from employment at Western
multinationals. In no way, however, is this to suggest preferential policies on the
sources of MNC investment. On the contrary, it appears that investment by MNCs
in Asia from diverse sources establishes positive industrial models as well as
organizational and trading options for domestic firms, it has huge economic
cascading effects, and provides much needed employment. In any case, a
projection of my analysis of essentially micro level phenomena within subsidiaries
of MNCs onto national economic growth scenarios is beyond the parameters of
this paper. Rather, the work here presents a new perspective for analysis of the
interactions of investment, government policy, and economic growth in Asia and
suggests that debate over both the Asian developmental state and the flying
geese models should still be considered wide open.
But, at the level of the firm, we are on more solid ground. Even in the
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fundamentally standardized world of production of consumer goods, the argument
that the interplay of world markets and on-going technological innovation drives
MNCs toward similar internal organizational structures and processes does not fit
the facts. At the very least this research shows that the social milieu of
multinationals or, for the purposes of this discussion, who owns the company,
matters to the organization of production and the quality of managerial technology
transfers. We know that Japanese management travels to Asia, but the Thai data
suggests that it may less often arrive there.
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